


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
REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

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Defense Production and the Party-Governmental
Bureaucracy: A Local Perspective

The network of party and government organizations responsible for monitoring the production of Soviet defense industry establishments may be larger and more complex than has been generally recognized. The network may extend to the oblast level in areas where defense plants are located, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Defense production is controlled by at least four party and government bureaucracies. The bureaucratic tangle implied by such an arrangement adds considerably to our understanding of recently lowered estimates of Soviet efficiency in defense production.

[REDACTED] the party committee for Lvov Oblast had its own Defense Industry Department to which [REDACTED] production figures were reported monthly. The fact that such departments have not previously been identified at the local level makes the report no less credible. At the national level, only the head of the CPSU Central Committee's Defense Industry Department (Ivan Serbin) has been publicly identified. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] head of the local Defense Industry Department (G. N. Pyzhik) has been publicly identified as a "department chief" (unspecified) with the Lvov Obkom.

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The Four Party-Government Control Mechanisms

In addition to illuminating the scope of local party supervision, [redacted] insight into the relationship between the various organizations involved in defense production. This has often been difficult to assess because of Party Secretary Dmitry Ustinov's penchant for ignoring echelons and dealing directly with people in various defense-related organizations. [redacted] plant received orders from the Military-Industrial Commission (VPK) specifying the military units to receive the equipment, the type and quantity of items to be produced, and the delivery deadlines. These orders also specified which administration within a particular ministry was to supervise production. The ministry, in turn, was responsible for incorporating VPK orders into the production plan issued to the plant. [redacted]

[redacted] military representatives stationed at the plant served as quality control experts, [redacted]

[redacted] From the local perspective, the roles of the party, the VPK, the government, and the defense establishment can be addressed as follows: the party (through its local Defense Industry Department) as auditor; the government ministry as line supervisor; the VPK as "broker" for the ultimate consumer--the Soviet military establishment; and the military representative as quality controller and plan monitor.

Compartmentation at the Plant

[redacted] Defense production is a separate, insulated, secret branch of the national economy, and compartmentation and secrecy extend down to the individual plant and even to certain activities within the plant. This secrecy is enforced by the military and the KGB. For example, all documentation related to defense production is separate from

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regular economic and administrative documentation.

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